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Overlappings between ciyil law (private law) and labour law 
as regards the branch of law and the legal principles 
Comments about the legal qualifications of collective agreements 
The collective agreement from its beginning belonged to one of the legal 
institutions, legal qualification of which was subjected to the regulation 
of private law until the appearance of the independent labour law. Collective 
agreements, compared to contracts, had however a lot of peculiarities which 
raised some serious problems about the legal qualification for the capitalist 
jurisprudence and led to different views and theoretical trends. 
The purpose of this study is to deal mainly with some historical and 
legal-dogmatic aspects of these questions until the appearance of the de-
pendent labour law. 
Collective agreements at the age of liberal capitalism 
The collective agreement appears when the contrast between capita-
lists and the working class grows embittered and the inner contradiction 
of the capitalism becomes obvious; and when the working class as an orga-
nized and homogeneous class becomes strong enough to rise against the ex-
ploitation of capitalism, and when they are able to extort certain rights 
from their employers. We cannot say at all that the organization and the 
strength of the working class reached a high level so far, as they were not 
able to fight for general improvements but they wanted to achieve better 
living conditions. To realize these objectives they had to lead political and 
economic fights, as well. This struggle showed economic marks in its earlier 
stage but in the course of the further development it gradually filled with 
political elements. The fundamental goal of organizing the working class 
into a homogeneous force could only be carried out by trade unions and some 
other specialized worker organizations. We share Miklós Világhy's opinion 
who states that certain agreements made between employees and employers 
before the establishment of trade unions could not be considered to be collec-
tiv agreeements because their realization and predominance could not be 
secured then by the power of working class or as a matter of fact, the work-
ing class could not force the capitalists1 to take into consideration the agre-
ements. 
1 Miklós Világhy: "Comments about the collective agreement" (Lecture) 
Published by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Seri. I. Alt. Társ. Tud. Vol. 
I. No. 2., page 64. 
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The same opinion is expressed by Sidney and Beatrice Webb in their 
remarkable work of "Workers' Democracy" that runs as follows: "Only the 
labour organizations can give stability and elasticity to the mutual com-
promise."2 Some pages later: "When there is no understanding, the wage 
2 Vol. I. page 203. translated by E. György 
workers being strategically weak, what originates from the fact that they are 
unable to determine the final price of their own work, are forced to accept 
the lowest wages". We can regard the agreements made before the 
establishment of trade unions as collective agreements only in etymological 
meaning, because they are nothing else than individual service contracts 
made by the representatives of the employer under the same conditions. 
(It is interesting to mention that such collective agreements made on the 
basis of the Zen_on papyrus in the age of Ptolemaios have been found in 
Egypt* but, on the other hand, we have not got any relics of this kind of 
the Roman private law.) 
It was obvious for the working class that "If the economic circumstances 
of the parties are not equal, the legal freedom enables the strategically more 
powerful party to dictate the conditions."3 This is the base of the thought 
of organizing the working class into a unified structure. When the organi-
zation, the political and social strength are so powerful that the employers 
find much better to make certain concessions than to refuse the demands 
of the workers directly, and to undertake all consequences of a general 
strike; the collective agreement appears in this situation as a social phe-
nomenon trying to smooth the contradiction, risen between capitalists and 
workers temporarily. 
According to the facts mentioned above, the establishment of collective 
agreements is fundamentally based on the consolidation of trade unions or 
to express it in another way, the trade unions, beside their economical 
function, must take care of safeguarding the workers' interest, wich is the 
real task of any workers' organizations. Such trade unions could be fround 
— according to Werner Sombart — first in England in 1851 (Special 
Organization of the United Machine Building Workers). It is natural that 
the first collective agreements appeared also here, in 1860. The Trade Union 
of weavers in Nottingham, and later on the Trade Union of Building 
Workers in Wolverwhampton in 18664. From that time on, the spread of 
collective agreements showed an ever growing tendency all over the world; 
in Germany, for example, more than a thousand collective agreements were 
recorded at the turn of the century. Jászai mentioned 176 Hungarian 
collective agreements in 19075. During World War I., the spread of collective 
agreements increased because the parties took every opportunity to find the 
most suitable means to secure the undisturbance of productions in war 
time. All of the possibilities of a strike had to be avoided, thus it seemed 
to be proper for the capitalists subsidizing the war industry to make 
2 Vol. I. page 203, translated by E. György 
3 S. and N. ebb. page 247. 
4 For more references see: Permeczky: "The collective agreement" Budapest 
1938, page 51. 
5 Jászai: "The history of the Hungarian Trade Unions" 1925, page 81. 
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concessions for those who worked in war industry in form of collective 
agreements. 
So the collective agreement appeared in the society as well, and it spread 
and was applied in wide circles. The law, however, as one of the vehicles 
of the ruling class for ensuring their power could not be indifferent to this 
social phenomenon either. Naturally, it had been quickly noticed by the 
legislators that the collective agreement did not mean anything else but the 
restriction of the capitalist to a certain extent; therefore the law was turned 
against collective agreements and they wanted to limit the spreading and 
sucess of collective agreements by means of legal rules. The success of 
collective agreements could be hindered by the law in two vays. 
1. One of them was the direct prohibiton. This method was mainly 
accepted by the countries where the capitalism failed to develop to a greater 
extent, and thus it seemed to be easier to refuse the demands of working 
class. The best example for that can be found in our own home practice. 
According to the Act VIII of 1872, art. 93 and Act XVII of 1884, art. 162. 
" . . . agreements between workers on striving for higher wages by general 
strikes . . . have no legal effects". 
But this situation could not be kept for a long time, anywhere, and 
after a few years this direct prohibition practically ceased existing in Hun-
gary, too. The spread of collective agreements could not be hindered by 
legal rules any more. This did not mean that the law gave up fighting 
against the collective agreements or would have wished to defend them 
suddenly. It only tried to hinder the assertion of collective agreements in 
different ways and with different tactics. 
2. .The method of exerting an indirect counter effect on collective 
agreements by means of the power of legal rules began to be more frequent 
than the method mentioned above. In states where spreading and streng-
thening of the workers' movements were general, the prohibiton of coalitions 
and organizations were gradually stopped as it happened in England by the 
so called Act of Peel in 1824, and in France when the well-known Loy 
Chapelier brought by the legislature of the French Revolution in 1791 was 
set aside, and in Germany in 1872, etc. Thus, the possibility to make 
collective agreements was given in principle in these and other countries, as 
well. The legal reaction ,could be detected in the fact that the law did not 
give any possibilities to enforce the rights originating from collective 
agreements. This legal enforcement was refused either by legal rules (as in 
England by the Trade Union Act No. 181) or by the fact that collective 
agreements were not mentioned at all. Though the possibility to enforce them 
modelled on the private contracts, formally existed, but concretizing such 
claims was consequently hindered in the practice of the court. Collective 
agreements made between 1860—1890 had originally been tariffical respects 
and after a rather slow and gradual fight their content widened. Later, the 
working conditions were regulated more thoroughly and the parties 
considered it necessary to regulate all the details by means of collective 
agreements. 
Summarizing everything about collective agreements being characteristic 
of the second half of the 19th century, we have to emphasize that we were 
facing such a social phenomenon which had been explicitly prohibited at 
the beginning, later on, however, it tried to hinder its development 
indirectly and its regulation was rather primitive and uncertain. Only one 
example: the parties almost always agreed on the legal effects originating 
from any break of the collective agreement but its realization seemed to 
be rather problematic. Planiol is right in saying that the validity of the 
collective agreements is secured by the facts being outside the circle of 
law. The collective agreement functions only when its assertion is secured 
by the working class and by the strength of trade unions. When this strength 
was missing, the legal "disordered order" gave unlimited opportunities to 
the capitalists to utilize the temporary weakness of trade unions and to 
withdraw, without much hesitation, the concessions granted and to break 
the rules, because the law did not redress it at all or only partly. 
At the age of the "clear captalism" the legal qualification of the 
collective agreements meant no problems at all. Namely, when its existance 
was acknowledged, it was regarded as a simple private contract. It meant 
only that collective agreements did not belong to the forbidden transaction 
in spite of the fact that the structure of the collective agreement differed 
from that of other private transactions in many ways. The legal defence 
of collective agreements were denied by the court because — according to 
their opinion — collective agreements differed no much from a simple 
private transaction that granting of any legal protections was quite 
impossible. Perneczky underlines the following in his work: "Relations, 
wanted by the collective agreement differed so much from the individual 
living conditions belonging to the circle of private law, that it is no 
wonder if they are reluctantly accepted by the courts not only in our 
country but abroad, as well. It is interesting to mention one part of Dr. 
David Papp's comments about collectiv agreements on the debate of the 
Gentlemen of the Robe in 1909. According to him the regulation is not 
necessary because — as he says — "it is impossible to empower the 
coliective agreements with the effect of civil law, or to enclose the collective 
agreements into the civil law coming from the Roman law, because it is 
nothing to do with the Roman law or with our present law"6, The reason 
for which the assertion of the collective agreement was declined is 
completely indifferent. But it was important that the employers found their 
ways not to suffer damage. So, the legal qualification could not be risen 
at all ini the! jurisprudence till the end of 1800. 
Collective agreements in the age of monopoly capitalism 
At the turn of the century, the whole inner system of capitalism suffered 
a fundamental and structural change. Those serious difficulties due to the 
inner contradictions of capitalism could not be solved any more within the 
old frames. Economic and social life changed radically and so did the legal 
system, too. It was the age of imperialism. It could not be doubted that 
such an important and spreading social and legal institution as collective 
agreements in the course of further development bore the marks of 
imperialism. 
During the days of imperialism the working class grew stronger and 
was able to deepen the intensity of its fight. On the other hand, capitalists 
6 Lectures held at the meetings of the Gentlemen of the Robe of Hungary, 
in 1909. 
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became stronger and led to an increasing social tension. Due to the wide-
spreading class struggles collective agreements spread all over the world, 
too. As regards this collective agreements, the earlier policy could not be 
followed by the legislator either. The strength of the working class was 
much greater then, so, the collective agreements embodying their demands 
could not be legally neglected. Thus, the legal systems of the states showed 
their attitude in one or another way in connection with the collective 
agreements nearly all over the world since 1910. The opinions were various. 
On the basis of profound examinations of the legal regulation of the 
collective agreements and taking into consideration the time elapsed until 
World War II., we can detect there main tendecies. The first group consists 
of states which not only acknowledge the collective agreement but requalify 
as a legal rule — according to the components given below. This happens by 
means of the so called "longdistance operating" force. To the second category 
belonged states where the collective agreement was considered as a private 
legal transaction. And in the fascist countries where imperialism, reached its 
fullest and most developed form, collective agreements were expressis verbis 
forbidden by law. 
Before discussing the above mentioned three tendencies, the legal concept 
of the "long-distance operating force", used so often, has to be elicited. The 
long-distance operating force means that every agreement and individual 
contract, the content of which is contradictory to the meaning of the 
collective agreements, having long-distance operating force, is to be 
disregared and they are automatically replaced by the rules comprised in 
collective agreements. This rule prevails when the individual service 
contract is made by those who are under the power of collective agreements 
or by members of the parties representatives of which made a collective 
agreements. If the legal effect of the collective agreement deteriorates the 
items of the service contract, by means of the long-distance operating force, 
it is regarded as "a transforming force" in literature and if this legal effect 
compensates for the items being not regulated in the individual service con-
tract, we can speak about a "supplementary force." The long-distance ope-
rating force works more powerfully, when it also includes those who vill 
later become members of the organization appointed to make collective ag-
reements and those who are not members of any organizations, but who are 
working in fields under the force of the collective agreement. This legal 
effect is well known as a "common compulsory force" in literature. The 
long-distance operating force — according to our opinion — has two funda-
mental effects: it penetrates into the content of the individual service con-
tracts; and this effect could be regarded as the objective side of the long-
distance operating force, and on the other hand it imposes a compulsory 
attitude for the subjects making the agreements and belonging to certain 
social status. "(Under certain social status" it is meant that whether some-
one is a member of the organization appointed to make collective agreements 
or not). That is considered to be the subjective side of the long-distance 
operating force. If the collective agreement has only a supplementary or 
transforming effect then the subjective effect is partial, but in case of col-
lective agreements with common compulsory force we can speak about a 
general subjective force — in our opinion. The long-distance operating effect, 
whatever form it appears in the collective agreement, is secured by the legal 
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rule, but thé agreement of transacting parties is not sufficient. The long-
distance operating force has an overwhelming importance; it has an eleva-
tory effect by which the collective agreement gets out of the circle of a 
simple transaction and gets into the field of the objective law. 
Having explained the above mentioned questions, let us examine the 
different states among the main groups. The classification outlined here ex-
tends to World WTar II., but after it a completely different situation took 
place that vill be discussed later. 
In our classification the first main group involves the countries where 
the collective agreement was empowered with long-distance operating force 
by the legal rule. Here — according to the factors discussed later — the 
agreements made earlier were replaced by collective agreements having 
the power of the legal rule. Two categories can be found within the main 
groups mentioned. To the first category belong the countieres the legislature 
of which acknowledges the transforming and the supplementary character of 
the long-distance operating force, so the compulsory effect touches only the 
parties. Switzerland, France and Poland belong to this group to the Acts 
passed in 1911, 1919 and in 1933, respectively. The collective agreement, how-
ever, has been empowered with compulsory effect in France since 1936, 
and this common compulsory force was acknowledged in Poland, too, in a 
certain degree. To the second category of the first main group belong the 
states acknowledging the common compulsory force of the collective agree-
ement. Finnland acknowledged it in 1924, Norway in 1927, Sweden in 1928, 
Holland in 1927, Austria in 1919 and Weimar Germany in 1918. To this cate-
gory belonged France too, from 1936 on. 
To the second main group belongs the countries where the collective 
agreement was judged by the general rules of private law; where the agree-
ment had a special structure and the transaction was regarded as a pri-
vate contract with the legislator. This was decided either by a rule or it 
was acknowledged as a contract of the common law. The collective agreement 
was considered to be a simple private contract and was tolerated in these 
countries. The regulations were also different here, for example, in Denmark 
they handled it as a nominated contract. Elsewhere, (according to the Czech, 
Roumanian, Yugoslav and Belgian legislatures) it was regarded as an inno-
minated contract. The situation was the worst in such countries where the 
collective agreement was tolerated and recognized as a private transaction, 
but the legal rights originating from this transaction were not allowed to 
be enforced by their law and order. England belonged to one of these count-
ries where the possibilities of enforcing such rights was excluded by the 
Trade Union Act passed in 1871. It was strengthened by the Trade Disputes 
Act in 1906. 
At first sight there are some points in the Trade Union Act passed in 
1871 which seem to serve the interests of trade unions by releasing them 
from bearing the responsibility for the damages caused by strikes. But in 
fact this was not true; and it followed from the order of the Trade Dispute 
Act and Trade Union Act passed in 1927 which claimed that the Act had 
passed in 1906 (which was quite equal to the Act passed in 1871), could not 
be applied in case of an "illegal strike." To declare whether a strike illegal 
or legal was up to such organs which were considering the questions always 
from the side of the ruling class. .If a strike was declared to be illegal, the 
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trade union had to pay. On the other hand due to the above mentioned Acts 
the right of the trade unions could not be used against the capitalist em-
ployer breaking the contract. Thus, the collective agreement could be regarded 
as a natural obligation in England. It was interesting and rather characteris-
tic of the English conservativism that the collective agreement was not 
rearranged by the legal rule, it was left unchanged in its earlier form in the 
age of imperialism. The collective agreement became a natural obligation in 
the United States of America as well as in Canada. 
To the third group belonged the states where the adoption of the col-
lective agreement was explicitly forbidden. To this group belonged, first 
of all, the fascist Germany where to make collective agreement was strictly 
forbidden from 1934 on. The fascist Italy belonged to this group, too, but 
the settlement of the problem showed rather special features. According to 
the Italian legislation, the collective agreement could only be made by orga-
nizations acknowledged legally. Acknowledged organizations could be such 
ones, which had suitable political activities and if they did not fulfill this 
requirement, the acknowledgement granted could be withdrawn. Here the 
strike was strictly forbidden and was against the penal law. There was no 
doubt that we could not speak about workers' organizations in such circum-
stances. Thus the agreements made between such workers' organizations which 
did not represent the true interest of the workers, and the capitalists could 
not be regarded at all as collective agreements. When we wish to put the 
Hungarian collective agreements into any of the above mentioned categories, 
it can hardly be doubted that their place is among the innominated contracts. 
Act VII. in 1936 showed the legal settlement of this question, but as we shall 
see it later, the Act filled the private transaction with the elements of pub-
lic law. 
The legal settlement of the collective agreements occupied a rather spe-
cial position in the Soviet Union before World War. II. Here we have to 
emphasize that the Soviet collective agreements differed from the above 
mentioned types from the very beginning, so we could not put them into 
any of the above-mentioned categories. 
We have also to deal with the role the jurisprudence played as regards 
the collective agreements and what this new legal institution looked like. 
We mentioned that this question could not be raised at all till the turn of 
the century. But when collective agreements obtained a general importance 
at the early stage of the monopoly capitalism, jurisprudence itself could not 
turn a blind eye, to this legal institution either and began to give scientific 
explanations. Circumstances that the collective agreement was carefully 
studied by legal theorists pushed forward the development as well as the 
wide-spreading and its popularity. Legal scholars contributed to the fact that 
the written positive law dealt with the collective agreement and created one 
of the preliminary conditions for regulations to come up to the practical re-
quirements. Philip Lotmar had been the first who dealt with the collective 
agreement in his study published in 1900. He and Sinzheimer are regarded 
as leading characters in the field of collective agreements is the German li-
terature. But the collective agreement was studied rather early in the French 
literature as well, and was scientifically analysed by Jay and Raynank, 
too. In that time Lotman declared that was necessary to empower the col-
lective agreements with automatical long-distance operating force, which was 
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a completely strange idea from the point of view of the written law. But 
from that time on, the question of the legal qualification of the collective 
agreements became more and more complicated. The subject of the debate 
widened constantly and the jurisprudence coped with it but difficulty. The 
main problem was whether the collective agreement could be regarded as a 
simple private contract or we should face another form of contract being an 
entirely new form in the world of law. It was Sinzheimer who explained 
the difference clearly between the collective agreement and the individual 
contract of service. In spite of this, a lot of questions remained open. The 
new transaction, in its own age, differed so much from any other transactions 
known until then, that it was rather questionable whether it was that or not. 
The subject of the debate always widened when states empowered the col-
lective agreement continuously with the long-distance operating force. Thus, 
it was filled in with public law elements. The general opinion was, however, 
that is was impossible to push the transaction into the sphere of the public 
law, because the opposing parties had enjoyed a formal equality and thus su-
bordination and superordination, so characteristic of the legal relations of 
public law, were missing. The whole complex of the questions led to the 
problems connected with the dualism of jurisdiction, and an institution 
querying the dualism from theoretical aspects was brought forward again. 
Naturally, the question of the qualification of the collective agreement arose 
in the source of law simultaneously. 
In connection with the subject of the debate, different positions were 
occupied by the representatives of civil jurisprudence. We may classify the 
same opinions into five basic groups. According to our classification to the 
first group belong those where the collective agreement is regarded as a 
private transaction, quite independently of whether it is connected with the 
long-distance operating force or not. The main representatives of this ten-
dency are Iaxobi and Hueck. To the second group belong who regard the 
collective agreement as an objective law even without any long-distance 
operating forces. Duguit, Cruet and Leroy are the main representatives of 
this trend, Philip Lotman thinks similarly, too, because he wants to consider 
the long-distance operating force to be conceptually inserted into the collec-
tive agreement. 
The third group consists of those who regarded the collective agreement 
without any transforming force as a private contract, but collective agree-
ments with transforming force were considered to be legal rules. The most 
famous representatives of this trend are Kaskel, Sinzheimer (he himself be-
longed tp the first group) Nepperdey and Simpson. Károly Szladits belonged 
to this group, too. According to the lawers belonging to the fourth group, the 
collective agreement with a common compulsory effect was considered as a 
legal rule. (Most scholars agree on this.) We could not put into the fifth cate-
gory those who considered the collective agreement as a temporary pheno-
menon with an uncertain situation (Lemire, John Clarke Adam). 
In conncetion with these categories some dogmatic-critical remarks are 
presented here. 
ad. 1. According to the scholars belonging to this group, the collective 
agreement always appeared and came into existence in the form of a con-
tract. They thought that the long-distance operating force meant that the 
capacity was voluntarily restricted for a given time by the concluding par-
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ties, therefore they decline to make any agreements controversary to a col-
lective agreement with long-distance operating force.7 We cannot share this 
opinion. Naturally, it is not valid for a collective agreement with common 
compulsory force, where the capacity of all parties is restricted by law. 
Independently whether the interested party is renounced or not. If we do not 
take this into consideration, we have to evaluate this opinion rather negativ-
ely. The capacity is not restricted by that the long-distance operating force is 
given up voluntarily by the parties, because the strength to the long-distance 
operation is not given by that, but on the contrary, it gains power by restrict-
ing the capacity by law. It is not an exaggeration to state that all of the 
legal rules determining obligations restrict the capacity for the subordinated 
to a certain degree. 
The long-distance operating force is like a lock, through which obliga-
tory effects penetrate into the service contract. The most important cogent 
effect can, however, not be made other service contracts but only in conso-
nance with the content of the collective agreement. 
ad. 2. To quality the collective agreement rule of law, is hardly accept-
able. If it is not empowered with a longdistance operating force it will be 
handled theoretically as a private contract by the written law. The value of 
this tendency was in those days when the idea of the long-distance operating 
force had not been accepted, yet, that the introduction of it was urged and 
a good theoretical fundation was given to it. 
ad. 3. The theory belonging to the third group contains the most debated 
points. Accordingly, the collective agreement without long-distance operating 
force is merely a nominated or innominated private contract, while, it is 
a legal rule. László Szilágyi, finds in his comments, the raising of this 
question in this way to be too simple. It is no doubt that the collective 
agreement even without a long-distance . operating force is a non-tipical 
agreement and when it is empowered with it, it will not be different from 
sources known other of law. When we wish to get the real position, we 
have to take into consideration this fundamental difference. It is another 
question, what kind of contract the collective agreement is and what character 
it has as a soruce of law. Whether we consider the collective agreement a 
nominated or innominated transaction with the long-distance operating force, 
it depends on the point of view taken by the private law rules in the states 
to be examined. We must consider the real position a basic point, the final 
decision depends on the way the collective agreement is treated by legal 
rules and by the court. In Denmark, for example, it is treated as a nominated 
transaction while elsewhere as an innominated one. It may occure that the 
lawmaker and the applier, as well, deals with it as "sui generis", due to its 
special structure. In spite of all these, here collective agreements are 
considered as private contracts. We have to contradict to those who regard 
the collective agreement only as a "preliminary agreement". In that case 
the parties can insist on making the real agreement. In case of collective 
agreements, however, nobody can raise a legal claim to make service 
contracts and it cannot be regarded as a "private agreement" either, because 
one of its essential points of settling any dispute or the uncertain legal 
7 The collective agreement is discussed by Gusztáv Vincenti in "The limita-
tions of freedom of contract." (Private law reuglations of the work. Budapest, 
1942, page 77.) 
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relation risen between the parties can be solved by mutual submissiveness. 
Even if the mutual indulgence is accepted in the collective agreement, we 
cannot say, that the mutual submissiveness is in causal relation with the 
debatable legal relation. Coming back to the above mentioned facts, 
according to the representatives of the present trend, empowering the 
collective agreement with the long-distance operating force establishes the 
substantive law if only the transforming and the supplementary power exists. 
We share this opinion in historical and dogmatical questions. 
The collective agreement is to be regarded as a legal rule with particular 
effect. (Collective agreements with common compulsory force have a 
universal effect.) If the legal rule has particular effect, there is a possibility 
to elude its regulations. 
Here we are going to examine the opinions about the compulsory force 
in the theory of the source of law. The opinion that the collective 
agreement consists of two parts a "normative one" and an "obligatory one" 
has spread in literature since Kaskel. The normative part contains the 
elements that will be the obligatory points of the service contract. This is 
the part which is considered to be the substantive law in the theory of 
sources of law. Besides the obligatory part can be found as well, what 
means personal obligations for the contracting parties. 
According to a rather general opinion, fidelity to regulations of work 
and bond of peace are regarded as obligations. Fidelity means that the 
employer does not make and keep up any service contracts, in respect of 
the given persons, which are contrary to the collective agreement. According 
to the bond of peace, the employer cannot do anything disturbing the peace 
of the work; its most important requirement is to reserve from the exclusion 
of the workers. The bond of peace is valid for trade unions, too, and its 
basic effect is to reserve from organizing strikes. Both fidelity and the bond 
of peace prescribe negative attitude. The obligatory part, according to the 
above mentioned, belongs to the substantive laws. This point of view was 
sharply criticised by Miklós Világhy. He is right in saying that "the collective 
agreement as a phenomenon of life and as a concept shows unified structure. 
To break down this unit on a dogmatic base is rather inappropriate.8 He says 
rather effectively: "it is impossible to speak about a thing once as a legal 
rule and, another time to state that the consequences of the private law 
originating from breaking the bond has to be applied for it.9 
We share Világhy's opinion entirely. The collective agreement can only 
be broken dogmatically. But at the closer dialectical examination of the 
phenomenon, the unity of the collective agreement is doubtless. The concept 
of fidelity is really one part of the collective agreements but not the essential 
one which may claim for legal feature. Fidelity to the regulations of work 
means that the points of the contract are kept by the contracting parties and 
no controversary agreements are made. If the collective agreement in respect 
of the normative part is considered a legal rule which determines the circle 
of subordinated persons then it follows-from its legal character that contracts 
contrary to the law should be made. All legal rules involve the requirement 
that not controversary attitude should be shown especially by the persons 
who had created them. It is difficult to deny that law and order empower 
8 Review of the Society of the Gentlemen of the Robe, 1948, Nos. 1-2, page 129. 
9 Publications of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. No. 1. page 63. 
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the collective agreement with the long-distance operating force because it 
intends to ensure its obligatory force. It is quite useless to emphasize the 
obligation of parties not to show any attitude contraversary to the collective 
agreement as it comes from its substantive law character. According to some 
experts, the so called "excluding argeement" belongs also to the obligatory 
part of the collective agreement. The "excluding" agreement means, that 
the contracted parties are not allowed to make service contracts with non-
members on the basis of the collective agreement. In our opinion, the parties 
who have defined the content of the legal rule determine the circle 
subordinated to the collective agreement, so they set limits to their own 
rights. The legal rules often contain some points which, over & certain 
extent, are forbidden to apply. It has not been considered to be a special 
kind of obligatory contract in case of the collective agreement, because it 
belongs to the so called "normative" part like fidelity to the regulations of 
work or the bond of peace. After this it seems to be superfluous to examine 
in detail the agreements of small importance which according to certain 
experts, are regarded as "obligatory elements'. The estimation of these 
agreements is the same as that of fidelity to the regulations of work, bond 
of peace and that of excluding agreement incorrectly classified as a special 
obligatory part by certain authors. 
In connection with the above we wish to quote the brilliant statements 
of László Szilágyi who criticised the normative and obligatory parts. He 
says: "Undoubtedly, this classification is artificial and it seems as if we 
wished to explain a human being by enumerating his chemical components." 
He comes to the final conclusion: Dissecting the collective agreement into 
a normative and an obligatory part does not solve the problem and does not 
give an answer to the question what the legal nature of the whole collective 
agreement is.10 
ad. 4. It could not be doubted in its own age at all, that the collective 
agreement with common binding force was a legal rule because it usually 
appeared in form of the rule of law. Thus, the arguments brought up 
against not only the content but the form, too, proved false. 
ad.- 5. These rather changeable opinions belonging to this group do not 
touch the collective agreement at all. Szirtes's point of view, however, is 
characteristic. According to him, the collective agreement is not a "labour 
contract" and formally it cannot be regarded as law. What happens, however, 
in the collective agreement is law-making.11 The representatives of this 
tendency recognize the detachedness of collective agreements from private 
law but they do not put them into the sphere of substantive law. 
10 Lectures held at the meetings of the Gentlemen of the Robe of Hungary, 
1948, Nos. 1-2, page 145. 
11 Collective agreements, 1912. 
